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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION VERSUS SENIORITY LAYOFFS:
MUST THE LAST ALWAYS BE FIRST?t
So the last will be first, and the first last.
MATTHEW 20:16
I. Introduction
The current recession's impact on the field of labor relations has given new
meaning to this familiar biblical passage. As job layoffs have become more
frequent, a conflict has arisen between affirmative action programs seeking to
remedy past discrimination and the seniority system of layoffs used by many
employers. The purpose of federally supported affirmative action programs is to
eliminate present inequities created by past discrimination. The seniority system,
on the other hand, perpetuates those inequities, whether intentionally or not, by
mandating that the workers who are the last to be hired are the first to be laid
off.
This "Last Hired-First Fired" rule has disproportionately affected women,
blacks, and other minorities. These groups were already victims of discriminatory
hiring practices before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and con-
sequently are often the groups with the least seniority. As a result, their members
are the first to be laid off and are forced to bear the major burden of employment
cutbacks. Minority groups contend that any seniority system which results in plac-
ing such an inordinate burden on them violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by furthering the present effects of past discrimination.
Several recent federal court decisions have considered this question and have
reached varying results. The courts have discussed such factors as the legislative
history of Title VII, the "business necessity" defense to discriminatory practices,'
and prior decisions concerning seniority. The result has been a partial retreat from
- During the time between the completion of this article and its publication, the Fifth
Circuit rendered a decision on the Watkins appeal and reversed the district court's ruling that
the seniority system of layoffs furthered the effects of past discrimination. Watkins v. Steel
Workers Local 2369, 44 U.S.L.W. 2045 (5th Cir. July 16, 1975). The court emphasized the
fact that the particular employees involved had not shown that they personally were discrimi-
nated against in the past. Absent such a showing, the court expressed the view that to recall
black workers before senior white workers because other members of the black race had been
discriminated against would be to accord them preferential treatment on the basis of their race,
a preference prohibited by § 703(j) of the Act.
By adopting this rationale, the court avoided the effects-intent issue, preferring instead a
case-by-case search for proven individual discrimination. It is likely that this decision will be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
1 If racial discrimination is found in an employment practice, it may still be justified on
the basis of "business necessity." As a practical matter, the burden of proof is so great that
this defense presents no real obstacle to the modification of a seniority system to eliminate
racial discrimination. A seniority system is not a business necessity unless it is essential to the
safety and efficiency of the operation of the business. If a "reasonably available alternate
system" with less discriminatory effects is feasible, the seniority system must be modified. See
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971). Fear of labor
unrest and morale problems is not sufficient to justify perpetuation of discriminatory practices.
Id. at 662-63. Courts will make every effort to deny a business necessity justification for racial
discrimination, even to the extent of ordering instruction and on-the-job training of minorities
to alleviate any safety and efficiency problems. See Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp.
885, 907-08 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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the earlier policy of modifying seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of
past discrimination.' The recent decisions introduce intent to discriminate as a
requisite element for finding a Title VII violation.
Questions of social policy pervade even these judicial decisions which pur-
port to dispassionately state the law. In view of the apparent judicial retreat
from the outer limits of Title VII enforcement, the advocates of affirmative
action may well seek solutions and compromises outside the courtroom. Efforts
aimed at direct negotiations with the companies and unions themselves, with the
attendant threat of litigation, may lead to more voluntary solutions in the future.
Before considering this future, however, a closer look at the origins and develop-
ment of the issue is necessary.
II. History
A. Conflict Between Affirmative
Action and LIFO Layoffs
Traditionally, most companies rely upon plantwide seniority to determine
whom to lay off during employment cutbacks.' The shorthand phrase for this
practice, "Last In-First Out" (LIFO), graphically illustrates its effect: the most
recently hired employees are the first to be laid off. On its face, this is an
equitable method of reducing a work force. An inequity arises, however, in
that prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "discrimination in employment was
being openly practiced."' Many women and blacks were excluded from certain
jobs and industries until enforcement of the Act.' Consequently, these employees
have substantially less seniority than do their white male counterparts and there-
fore they are the initial subjects of layoffs under a LIFO system.
Any system of layoffs based upon seniority, then, affects women and minor-
ities disproportionately and may undercut many of the gains made by affirma-
tive action programs over the past decade. It is this effect which elicits the civil
rights challenge to the seniority method of determining layoffs.
B. The Nature of Seniority
Seniority may be measured by length of service in an entire plant, in a de-
partment, or in a particular job.' Any rights flowing from seniority typically
result from the collective bargaining agreement between union and manage-
ment.' Even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement many employers
use seniority in deciding upon promotions or layoffs. Since seniority benefits are
2 See text accompanying note 11 infra.
3 For statistics on use of seniority to determine layoffs, see BNA TncHNIQUES AND TRENDS
IN UNION CONTRACTs 16:945 (1972).
4 Craver, Minority Action versus Union Exclusivity: The Need to Harmonize NLRA and
Title VII Policies, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12-13 (1974).
5 Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965.
6 See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L.
Rxv. 1260, 1263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].




essentially contractual in nature, they are subject to modification by the courts to
the same extent as other contract rights.' Congress recognized this in passing
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At the same time, the legislators ad-
mitted the validity of seniority systems in general. Section 703 (h) of Title VII
provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges, of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin....
The specific nature of a "bona fide" seniority system is the subject of much
dispute. It is at the heart of the layoff issue, and is the critical factor in determin-
ing the courts' ability to modify seniority systems. It is necessary, therefore, to con-
sider those situations in which the courts have modified or eliminated a seniority
system.
C. Judicial History of Seniority Modification
Courts have not hesitated to modify seniority systems found to "perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination, including discrimination that occurred before
the effective date of the Act."'" However, until recently, such modifications were
exclusively restricted to departmental or job seniority systems. In those instances,
companies had segregated the departments or jobs on a racial basis, and when
forced to integrate them by the Civil Rights Act, refused to allow the transfer
of seniority from one department or job to another. The courts readily in-
validated such practices under Title VII." These decisions, however, dealt solely
with seniority's discriminatory effect on promotion and job assignment, not with
layoffs. Furthermore, most of these courts subsequently ordered the institution of
plantwide seniority systems as the proper remedy,' 2 the very practice currently at
issue. The Fifth Circuit, in Local 189, Papermakers v. United States,"3 specif-
ically rejected the creation of "fictional seniority" for "newly-hired Negroes" as
distinguished from the mere grant of equal status for time "actually worked" in
the plant."4
8 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971); Bush v. Lone Star Steel
Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 534 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
10 Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 n.4 (E.D. La. 1974).
11 See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (depart-
mental seniority); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (de-
partmental seniority); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (job seniority); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (departmental seniority).
12 Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 660-64 (2d Cir. 1971); Quarles v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 521 (E.D. Va. 1968).
13 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
14 416 F.2d at 995.
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These cases, while theoretically accepting the principle that seniority systems
may be modified to remedy the present effects of past discrimination, did not
specifically address the precise issue of plant seniority modifications with regard
to layoffs. The economic recession, however, has brought this question before
several courts within the space of a year.
III. Current Legal Status of Seniority Layoffs
A. Retreat from the "'Discriminatory Effects" Standard
1. The Watkins Case.
In Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369,'" the district court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana ruled that a plantwide seniority system used to deter-
mine order of layoffs was violative of Title VII. The court determined that
the system unlawfully perpetuated the effects of past discrimination" regardless
of the "intent" with which it was designed and utilized." It has been a common
practice of courts deciding Title VII cases to look at the discriminatory effects of
employment practices regardless of their on-the-face neutrality or the intention
with which they are adopted.' As the Fifth Circuit stated, "[E]mployment
practices which operate to discriminate ... violate Title VII, even though the
practices are fair on their face and even though the employer had no subjective
intention to discriminate."' 9 .
The Watkins court dealt exhaustively with many of the arguments voiced
against modification of plantwide seniority.2" It found these objections un-
persuasive in light of the Title VII policy favoring adoption of liberal remedies
to redress the effects of past discrimination. The court determined that the cases
which adopted plant seniority as a remedy did so not because it was valid per
se, but because the blacks in those cases had not been excluded from the plant
and thus had been able to accumulate plant seniority.2 Unlike other courts, it
did not find the legislative history of Title VII an obstacle to the modification of
plant seniority." Neither was the court deterred by the possibility of awarding
relief to minority employees who were not victims of the original discrimination.
Classwide relief, it was feared, would aid those who had never been discriminated
against and accord them preferential treatment.2 " Watkins cited court-approved
affirmative action programs in other areas which had the same effect.2
15 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), argued on appeal, 5th Cir., Jan. 20, 1975.
16 Id. at 1226.
17 Id. at 1224 n. 3 .
18 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1377 (5th Cir. 1974); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348 (5th Cir. 1972).
19 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1972).
20 Among these arguments are: the legislative history of Title VII; the difficulty of
identifying the discriminatees; and that plant seniority merits treatment different from job or
departmental seniority.
21 369 F. Supp. at 1225.
22 369 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
23 Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
24 369 F. Supp. at 1231.
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It considered the primary purpose of such class relief to be the prevention of
future discrimination and not necessarily the compensation of those actually
discriminated against in the past.
The Watkins case has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Two intervening
circuit court decisions cast some doubt upon its ability to survive this appeal.
2. The Waters Case.
In the first of these decisions, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 5 the Seventh
Circuit upheld the validity of a plantwide seniority system used to determine job
recalls and layoffs. In an interesting analysis, the court said that the LIFO prin-
ciple of layoffs was "not of itself racially discriminatory nor does it have the effect
of perpetuating prior racial discrimination. .. ."" The court cited the legislative
history of Title VII in support of its claim that such a seniority system is "bona
fide" under the Act." Waters determined that "an employment [i.e., plantwide]
seniority system is properly distinguished from job or departmental seniority sys-
tems for purposes of Title VII,"" because in the former there is "equal recog-
nition of employment seniority which preserves only the earned expectations of
long-service employees. " " The latter systems, on the other hand, presumably
could be used to foster unearned expectations by discriminating against long-
service minority employees. Noting that Title VII speaks only to the "future,"
the court determined that holding that an employment seniority system perpet-
uates past discrimination would be "tantamount to shackling white employees
with a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their em-
ployer.
'"30
The Waters court apparently was motivated by a desire to escape the ra-
tionale of the "effects" cases, where neutral employment practices were over-
turned when they perpetuated the present effects of past discrimination. "1 Rather
than distinguishing those cases on the ground that they involved different types of
seniority, the court chose to espouse the view that the LIFO principle did not
itself perpetuate past discrimination. This is a middle ground: The court upheld
plantwide seniority layoffs while remaining consistent with the view that employ-
ment practices which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination violate
Title VII and may be modified. As a practical matter this position implicitly
establishes the finding of intent to discriminate as a necessary prerequisite to
judicial modification of facially neutral plantwide seniority systems. By stating
that the LIFO principle itself must perpetuate past discrimination to be violative
of Title VII, Waters necessarily means either that the system must be discrimina-
tory on its face, or that it must be applied with discriminatory intent. Otherwise,
it is difficult to accept an assertion that a layoff system which results in dis-
proportionate minority layoffs does not perpetuate the "effects" of past discrimi-
25 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
26 Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1320.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 For a representative list of such cases, see note 18 supra.
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nation. These disproportionate layoffs are the direct, present results of past
discriminatory practices in hiring, and no exercise in semantics can disguise that
conclusion. Despite efforts to remain consistent with the "effects" principle, the
Waters position is actually a retreat from the "effects" standard of finding a
Title VII violation.
The court in Waters partially justified its position by arguing that if plant
seniority is held to perpetuate past discrimination, then white employees would
be shackled with the burden of past discriminatory practices in which they did
not join. Whether such a consideration should influence an objective decision
concerning the perpetuating effects of employment practices is debatable. It
ignores the view of several courts that white employees' hopes of benefiting from a
discriminatory seniority system may be frustrated whether or not those employees
acquiesced in the discrimination. Their expectations may be judicially frustrated
because they arise out of an "illegal system." 2 The Seventh Circuit in Wateis,
perhaps feeling uneasy about the strength of its rationale, did concede that there
was a "fine line" to be drawn between claims of discrimination and reverse dis-
crimination, and counseled employers to be "discreet" in devising employment
seniority systems."
3. The Jersey Central Case.
In Jersey Central Power & Light Company v. IBEW, 4 the Third Circuit
came full circle, avoided the semantics of Waters, and openly declared that a
plantwide seniority system would be overturned only if discriminatory on its face
or adopted with an intent to disguise discriminatory practices. In Jersey Central,
an employer sought a declaratory judgment as to whether it should follow the
seniority provision of its collective bargaining agreement or an agreement with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The employer could
not lay off employees without violating one of the two agreements. The district
court held that the employer should follow the EEOC agreement whenever it
conflicted with the collective bargaining agreement. 5 The Third Circuit vacated
and remanded, holding that a seniority system which provides for layoffs in
reverse order of seniority was "not contrary to public policy and welfare and con-
sequently not subject to modification by court decree."3" This was true even if
female and minority employees were disadvantaged by the system.
37
Citing the legislative history of Title VII, the majority concluded that
Congress "intended a plantwide seniority system, facially neutral but having a
disproportionate impact on female and minority group workers, to be a bona
32 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (21 Cir. 1971). iee also
Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 534 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
33 502 F.2d at 1320. The court was able to give the plaintiff relief on other grounds
without modifying the seniority system.
34 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
35 Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 8 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 690 (D.N.J., filed
Sept. 5, 1974), supplemented, 8 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 959 (D.N.J., filed Sept. 23, 1974),
vacated and remanded, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
36 508 F.2d at 705.
37 Id. at 710.
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fide seniority system within the meaning of § 703 (h) of the Act." " The court
defined a "bona fide" plantwide seniority system as one which is facially neutral
and was neither designed nor intended to disguise discriminatory practices." In
requiring that intent to discriminate be present to establish a Title VII violation,
it concluded that "a facially neutral company-wide seniority system, without
more, is a bona fide seniority system and will be sustained even though it may
operate to the disadvantage of females and minority groups as a result of past
employment practices."' 0 Considering this to be the proper interpretation of the
legislative intent of § 703(h), the majority concluded that any remedy alleviat-
ing the present effects of past discrimination concerning layoffs would have to
come from the legislature and not from the courts."
The concurring opinion in Jersey Central found fault with the majority's
interpretation of the legislative history of Title VII, and instead considered the
Watkins view of that history to be more accurate. Disagreeing with the necessity
of finding "subjective discriminatory intent," Judge Van Dusen concluded that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, did "not intend to preclude remedies altering
plant seniority which perpetuates discrimination." '42 Indeed, congressional intent
remains the subject of much dispute whenever seniority problems arise in a Title
VII context.
B. Legislative History of Title VII
Despite the view that "the legislative history of [Title VII] is singularly un-
instructive on seniority rights,"'" this same legislative history has been discussed
repeatedly in cases dealing with modification of seniority systems pursuant to
Title VII." The dispute centers around statements made by Senator Joseph
Clark on the Senate floor and on memoranda authored by Senator Clark, Senator
Clifford Case, and the Justice Department.
Senators Clark and Case were the Senate floor managers of the Title VII
bill. Their Interpretive Memorandum provided in part that, "Title VII would
have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not
retrospective."'" In response to a question posed by Senator Everett Dirksen,
Senator Clark stated:
If under a "last hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happened to be the
"last hired," he can still be the "first fired" as long as it is done because of
his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.46
38 Id. at 706.
39 Id. at 706 n.54.
40 Id. at 710 (emphasis supplied).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 712 (Van Dusen, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
43 Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
44 See, e.g., Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 707-08 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2dc 652, 661 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Watkins v.
Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), argued on appeal, 5th Cir., Jan.
20, 1975.
45 110 CoNG. Raec. 7213 '(1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
46 110 CONG. Rac. 7217 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
[V'ol. 51:107]
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A memorandum from the Justice Department presented by Senator Clark ex-
pressed the following view:
If... a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of layoffs,
those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not
be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the case
where, owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white
workers had more seniority than Negroes. 7
These statements appear to be explicit indications of legislative purpose; indeed,
the court in Watkins admitted that "if they accurately defined the meaning of
the statute, the defendants [those utilizing the seniority system] would prevail."48
The Watkins case, however, argues that these statements were made before
subsequent amendments to the bill, and that the amendments included a new
fair employment title which dealt directly with seniority for the first time in §
703(h)." The court expressed the view that, "In light of Section 703(h), the
courts have not accepted the Clark statements as reflecting the meaning of the
Act as to seniority."5 The opinion then notes that many courts have modified
seniority systems in spite of defenses based on the Clark statements. The court
therefore concluded that the statements themselves have been rejected as an
interpretive guide.51
Watkins correctly notes that many courts have modified seniority systems
despite the Clark statements, but the exclusion of this legislative history as an
interpretive guide may be premature. The cases which circumvent these state-
ments deal with job and departmental seniority systems, not with plantwide
systems.52 In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,5" the Second Circuit
modified a departmental seniority system, finding the Clark memorandum no
barrier. In doing so, however, the court stated that the memorandum "seems to
say at most that the seniority of a white on a job will not be affected by the claims
of blacks hired after he was."54 The court proceeded to order plantwide seniority
as the proper remedy.55 As previously indicated, both the Waters" and the Jersey
Central" cases relied on these statements and memoranda as indicative of legisla-
tive intent to sustain neutral plantwide seniority systems. It must also be re-
membered that § 703(h), providing an exemption for "bona fide" seniority
systems, was molded in part by Senator Dirksen,5" the very person who questioned
Title VII's effect on seniority systems, and who received the Clark statements in
response to those questions.
47 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
48 369 F. Supp. at 1228.
49 Id. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1229.
52 See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (job seniority).
53 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
54 Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 664.
56 502 F.2d at 1318-19.
57 508 F.2d at 706-07.
58 See Title VII, supra note 6, at 1272.
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A § 703(h) "bona fide" system has been defined as one which "can be
explained or justified on nonracial grounds.""9 In practice, this definition may
well beg the issue. Proponents of affirmative action contend that any system
furthering the effects of past discimination cannot be "bona fide," while sup-
porters of plantwide seniority view it as inherently "bona fide" if it is not created
with the intent to discriminate and is neutral on its face."0 Again, this is merely
a restatement of the "effects" versus "intent" standard for finding a Title VII
violation. As noted, the most recent case law adopts the requirement of an intent
to discriminate as a necessary prerequisite to finding such a violation.61
A close reading of § 703 (h), considering the Clark statements which pre-
ceded it and that Senator Dirksen helped draft it, seems to support the Jersey
Central analysis. Section 703(h) clearly states that differences in terms, condi-
tions and privileges of employment pursuant to bona fide seniority systems are
valid provided they are not the result of an "intention" to discriminate. " Though
courts have expanded this standard in the past in different contexts, the Jersey
Central retreat to the "intent" standard finds apparent justification in the ex-
plicit language of the statute, in its legislative history, and in the different context
in which it is applied-that of plantwide seniority. Thus, the Jersey Central
rationale stands on solid legal ground;6" plantwide seniority as a method of
determining layoffs, applied neutrally, does not violate Title VII. Beyond the
legal arguments, however, remain important questions of policy which must be
considered. These policy questions have influenced court decisions in this area
and will further influence the implementation of those decisions.
IV. Social Policy Considerations
A. Labor Opposition, Judicial Reluctance,
and the Likelihood of Legislative Relief
The conflict between affirmative action and seniority raises serious ques-
tions of social policy. Minorities and women who have borne the effects of dis-
crimination for years should not be forced to continue bearing those effects in
the future. Yet there remains a duty to protect the interests of the longtime
employee. Even granting that this older worker may have indirectly profited
from the discrimination against his minority contemporaries, denial of his senior-
ity rights based on arguments of moral responsibility is tenuous.
59 Id.
60 508 F.2d at 710.
61 E.g., Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
63 One method of overcoming the obstacle of Title VII's legislative history is the use of
§ 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, dealing with freedom to contract. 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970). This section is not restricted by Title VII legislative history and has been
interpreted as conferring a right of action against racial discrimination in employment. See
Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 (E.D. La. 1974). Section
1981's applicability to layoffs remains unclear, however, since freedom of contract appears





Organized labor can be expected to strongly oppose any drastic modifica-
tion of seniority rights. Seniority is one of the precepts upon which the labor
movement is based. Its purpose, in part, is to remove a source of worker dis-
content by substituting an objective standard for job priorities in place of what
might otherwise be an arbitrary or subjective decision by the employer or the
union.64 Modifying this system with regard to promotions or transfers is already
objectionable to many union members; modifying it with regard to layoffs is
unthinkable. Moreover, such a modification by the courts might well exacerbate
racial tensions. And while this is not, and never has been, a reason for retarding
the elimination of racial discrimination and its effects, it must be considered in
fashioning solutions to the present problem.
2. Judicial Reluctance
These considerations may explain the judicial reluctance to modify seniority
systems as applied to layoffs. Both Jersey Central and Waters rejected attempts
to modify or eliminate plantwide seniority systems which resulted in dispropor-
tionate minority layoffs. In addition, Watkins, while critical of such a system,
was more restrained in its remedy. The court pointed out that it was "disinclined
toward any remedy for the 1971-73 layoffs which would cause the immediate
displacement of any incumbent employee."65 In a later hearing on appropriate
remedies, the court ordered future layoffs to be apportioned according to the
relative percentages of whites and minorities in the work force regardless of
seniority. It further ordered the reinstatement with back pay of enough minority
workers to give minorities the same proportionate percentage of those employees
still working as they had of the total work force. But no white incumbent work-
ers who had not been laid off were to be laid off under this reinstatement. Every-
one was to receive 40 hours of wages even if the combination of a lack of work
and an increased work force required less than 40 hours of work.6 It must be
noted that this order was made possible, at least in part, by the fact that the
plant in question employed only 400 workers. Whether a similar order would
be viable in the case of massive layoffs in giant corporations employing thou-
sands of workers is doubtful. The Watkins court was not faced with the ultimate
choice between laying off disproportionate numbers of minority employees and
laying off white workers with more seniority. To date, no court-ordered modi-
fication of a seniority system has necessitated the latter result.
3. The Likelihood of Legislative Relief
The Jersey Central court advised the minority plaintiffs to seek a legislative
64 Gardner, An Overview of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Effect on Labor Organ-
izations-A Look Ahead, 17 LOYOLA L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1970).
65 369 F. Supp. at 1232.
66 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTicEs I 9766 (E.D. La. 1974). The court determined that
placing this heavy financial burden on the company rather than on the employees was justified
by the company's role in fostering past discrimination.
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solution to the problem.67 But legislative action in this area may be difficult to
obtain, since any attempt at a legislative solution would raise substantial political
problems. The combination of organized labor and more traditional opponents
of civil rights legislation would present an insurmountable obstacle to legislative
relief. Other political considerations, such as preservation of the fragile black-
labor coalition in the Democratic Party, might make many legislators skeptical
of seeking a legislative solution to such an explosive issue.
The courts might well consider, as a viable alternative, the granting of
equitable relief on a case-by-case basis, despite the sound legal arguments up-
holding seniority layoffs. The courts have broad equitable powers to remedy dis-
crimination pursuant to Title VII.68 Were a court to find, for instance, union
participation in prior discriminatory practices, it might be less reluctant to modify
a seniority system found to perpetuate the effects of those practices. Such a find-
ing would taint the "innocence" of those relying on the seniority system. 9
B. Relief Outside the Courtroom
Despite the various legal positions, the issue probably will be resolved out-
side the courtroom, where many efforts to deal with the problem of dispropor-
tionate minority layoffs are presently being effected. The New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights has issued a memorandum urging alternatives to
layoffs of minorities. They include reduction of personnel costs other than wages,
institution of a four-day workweek, seeking volunteers to take temporary leave,
and conducting layoffs on a rotating or alternating basis.70 Another alternative
is "inverse seniority," which would oblige older employees with high, contractual
unemployment benefits to bear the major burden of the layoffs."1
The EEOC is considering the issuance of guidelines, similar to those of the
New York City Commission, which would prohibit layoffs that have a "disparate
impact" on women and minorities." Employers forced to reduce costs would
be required to take other measures before resorting to layoffs, measures such as:
67 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
68 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 1974); Rowe v.
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Comment, Labor Law
Meets Title VII: Remedies for Discrimination in Employment, 6 CONN. L. Rav. 66, 83 (1973).
69 See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 115 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
The court there found two unions liable for their negotiation of discriminatory seniority
provisions and acquiescence in racial discrimination, stating that the unions had "failed in
their obligation under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII to protest racially dis-
criminatory employer hiring practices. .. ." See also Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
491 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974) (union held responsible for the natural consequences
of its efforts in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.,
362 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (union's affirmative obligation under § 1981 to
protect members from illegal discrimination includes responsibility to determine if the agree-
ments it negotiates lock in past discrimination); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp.
885, 906 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (union meeting its statutory duty of fair representation under the
National Labor Relations Act does not shield it from liability under Title VII).
70 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, Interpretive Memorandum Concerning
Procedures Required by Federal, State, and Local Anti-Discrimination Laws When an Employer
Is Planning Reduction in Labor Costs That Could Result in Layoffs, January 31, 1975 (on file
at the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights, Notre Dame Law' School).
71 One manufacturer, Deere & Co., developed such a plan on a voluntary basis. Tima,
Feb. 3, 1975, at 58, col. 1.
72 88 LAB. REL. Ryp. 216 (1975).
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reducing wages or hours, seeking voluntary retirements, or closing the plant for
a day or more during the week.7" If layoffs were the only feasible solution, the
employer would have to use such systems as rotating layoffs or a Watkins-type
apportionment formula. 4 The proposed guidelines interpret § 703(h) as not
exempting seniority systems from the Act's coverage. They define a "bona fide
seniority system" as one which does not displace a disproportionate number of
female or minority group employees from the work force as a result of the
employer's past discriminatory hiring, recruitment, or other employment prac-
tices."5
The issuance of these guidelines would be significant since the Supreme
Court has previously noted that EEOC guidelines are "entitled to great defer-
ence."" Action on these guidelines, however, has been deferred pending further
discussion. 7 The Justice and the Labor Departments oppose issuance of the
guidelines; both view the layoff-seniority issue as one which should be decided
by the courts, not the EEOC. 8 The courts, therefore, may not be presented
with the option of deferring to the guidelines.
In seeking voluntary modifications of seniority layoff practices, however, the
advocates of affirmative action need not rely entirely upon the good will of
employers and unions. Even though the legal arguments suggest that plantwide
seniority systems will be upheld in the abstract, there is sufficient doubt about the
outcome in individual cases to give minority forces some bargaining power vis-a-
vis the unions and employers. 9 This doubt, coupled with the potentially enor-
mous back pay damages for which the unions and employers would be liable
should they fail in court,"0 may be enough to obtain some "voluntary" modifica-
tions.
V. Conclusion
The conflict between affirmative action and plantwide seniority layoffs
rerpains a critical issue, one that can be expected to become even more critical if
the economic recession worsens. The judicial trend, culminating in Jersey
Central, is away from court-ordered modification of seniority layoffs in the
absence of an intent to discriminate. The courts are turning away from sweeping
changes in labor policy in favor of deferring to legislative efforts and voluntary
action. In so doing, the courts are on firm legal ground, as evidenced by statutory
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 88 LAB. REL. Rep. 313 (1975).
76 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). But see Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975) '(an opinion relying heavily upon Griggs, in which Chief
Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part, condemned "slavish adherence to the
EEOC Guidelines," id. at 2388).
77 88 LAB. REL. RBP. 313 (1975).
78 Id.
79 This "doubt" may be strengthened by the Watkins case, in that Waters admitted there
was a "fine line' between the arguments, and that Jersey Central was a 2-1 decision on the issue
of the seniority system.
80 Youngdahl, Suggestions for Labor Unions Faced with Liability Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 Ann. L. Ruv. 631, 649 (1973).
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language and legislative history."' Such a position also reflects extralegal con-
siderations of social policy. However, should such voluntary solutions or legisla-
tive efforts fail to eliminate the problem, the courts can and should consider in-
voking their broad equitable powers on a case-by-case basis to prevent minority
workers from once again bearing the effects of past discrimination. Extralegal,
voluntary solutions remain the most promising method of achieving an equitable
distribution of the economic burdens. If these extralegal responses fail to ade-
quately resolve the problem, however, the threat of court action remains.
William Ferguson
81 "[I]t seems unlikely that Congress expected Title VII in any circumstances to operate
directly to remove a white employee from his job." Title VII, supra note 6, at 1274.
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